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1 Introduction
The ﬁnancial sector plays an increasingly important role in a growing and
complex economy that generates more savings and investments. The ﬁnancial
sector inﬂuences not only the various types of risk undertaken in the economy,
but also how these risks are shared among agents. One standard approach
to studying the ﬁnancial sector is to assume that agents are risk-averse.
However, it is often assumed that as the economy grows with more agents,
each agent acts less risk-averse and makes risky decisions solely on the basis of
the expected rates of return, and not the underlying probability distribution
of these returns.
This idea that risk-aversion becomes risk-neutrality has its origin in the
literature on risk taking in the context of public investment. Namely, the
Arrow-Lind Theorem, which states that risk spreading among many taxpay-
ers renders social risk negligible (Arrow and Lind, 1970). Basically, as the
number of taxpayers grows, the risk premium (corresponding to a share of
the public risky project) of a risk-averse taxpayer decreases, and, in the limit,
goes to zero. Hence, whether the public investment should be undertaken
depends only on the expected return. Moreover, the social risk premium also
goes to zero so that the government only cares about the expected return
and not the risk.
The Arrow-Lind argument has been carried over to the private ﬁnancial
sector in an analogous way. It is argued that, with a very large number of
investors, risk spreading implies that the risk premium goes to zero and thus
eliminates any exposure to, and concern for risk. In other words, while the
shareholders are risk-averse, there is no need to account for their risk aversion
for large economies and they act as if they are risk-neutral.1 Hence, only the
expected payoﬀ of a risky asset must be considered for trading decisions,
which is then reﬂected in the market price.
It is the purpose of this paper to study whether risk and risk aversion have
an eﬀect on risk sharing in large economies with numerous agents. To that
end, we present a model of an economy in which risky projects are undertaken
1See Gollier (2001, p. 317) for instance.
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in the real sector and risk is shared among agents by the ﬁnancial sector.
Speciﬁcally, the economy is populated by both entrepreneurs and investors.
Entrepreneurs are the original owners of the ﬁrms. They undertake risky
projects and also issue assets. Investors share the risk of the investments
with the entrepreneurs but have no entrepreneurial prospects.
After characterizing the unique equilibrium of an economy with risk shar-
ing for a ﬁnite number of entrepreneurs and investors, we show that an expan-
sion of the economy with all sectors expanding does not eliminate exposure to
risk and that ﬁnancial prices reﬂect risk and risk aversion. That is, in the case
of non-vanishing entrepreneurial activity (i.e., the number of entrepreneurs
relative to the number of investors does not approach zero, but remains a
signiﬁcant part of the economy), risk sharing in a large economy or in the
limit economy depends on risk, risk aversion, and the level of entrepreneurial
activity relative to the size of the economy. In particular, equilibrium prices
are not equal to the expected returns of the assets.
We then consider the case of an expansion of the economy with van-
ishing entrepreneurial activity, i.e., the number of entrepreneurs becomes
insigniﬁcant compared to the number of investors as the economy grows.
The limiting outcomes of such an economy are identical to an economy with
a ﬁnite number of risk-averse entrepreneurs and risk-neutral investors, and,
thus, the risk premium of each agent is zero. However, the implication that
a zero risk premium in the limit means that only expected payoﬀ matters in
pricing risky assets in a large economy leads to an inconsistency. Suppose
that the ﬁnancial markets set prices equal to the expected payoﬀs of the as-
sets without any consideration for risk and risk aversion. Then, risk-averse
investors receive no risk premium and do not want to engage in risk sharing.
On the other hand, with the price of the asset equal to its expected value,
each entrepreneur would like to sell the entire investment to the investors.
This is not viable. In other words no trading is possible, which is opposite
to the case of risk-neutral investors.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the ﬁnancial model
and the equilibrium. Section 3 studies whether risk and risk aversion have
an eﬀect on risk sharing in large economies with numerous agents.
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2 Model and Equilibrium
In this section, we present a model of an economy in which risky projects
are undertaken in the real sector and risk is shared among agents by the
ﬁnancial sector. We then deﬁne and characterize the equilibrium for a ﬁnite
number of agents. The limits of these equilibrium outcomes are used in the
subsequent section to study whether risk and risk aversion are relevant in
large economies with numerous agents.
Consider an economy with NE > 0 entrepreneurs (or ﬁrms) and NI >
0 investors whose objective is to maximize the expected utility of wealth.
Entrepreneur j, the founder of ﬁrm j, issues equity shares that are claims on
the proﬁt r˜j generated by ﬁrm j. Here, r˜j = θj+ε˜j where θj is expected proﬁt
and ε˜j is a random shock.
2 The number of shares issued is normalized to
one. Entrepreneur j retains a portion of ﬁrm j’s shares, ωjj ∈ [0, 1], and sells
the rest in the ﬁnancial market, 1−ωjj , to investors and other entrepreneurs
in the ﬁnancial market. The proceeds of the sale are invested in other risky
assets and in the risk-free asset. Hence, the ﬁnal wealth of entrepreneur j is
W˜ ′j = ωjj r˜j + (1− ωjj)pj +
NE∑
k =j
(r˜k − pk)ωjk, (1)
where ωjk is entrepreneur j’s level of ownership in ﬁrm k and pk is the price of
a share of ﬁrm k. The term (1−ωjj)pj is the wealth generated by entrepreneur
j from selling claims to the proﬁts of ﬁrm j, which is diversiﬁed between
the risky assets issued by ﬁrms k = j and the risk-free asset. Speciﬁcally,
entrepreneur j buys ωjk shares of the risky asset issued by ﬁrm k = j at
price pk with random payoﬀ r˜k, and the remaining (1− ωjj)pj −
∑NE
k =j pkωjk
is invested in the risk-free asset with a rate of return normalized to one.
Investors do not have entrepreneurial prospects. However, they use their
initial wealth to purchase shares of the risky and the risk-free asset. The
2We abstract from the ﬁrms’ real decisions (e.g., production and output prices).
See Mirman and Santugini (2012) for an analysis of monopoly behavior when the ﬁrm
has access to the ﬁnancial market and shares the risk with several investors.
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ﬁnal wealth of investor i is
W˜ ′i = Wi +
NE∑
j=1
(r˜j − pj) zij , (2)
where Wi is initial wealth, r˜j − pj is the random per-share return of ﬁrm j
stock, and zij is the number of shares issued by ﬁrm j that is purchased by
investor i.
Both entrepreneurs and investors are assumed to have constant absolute
risk aversion (CARA) preferences over ﬁnal wealth. The random shocks have
both systematic and idiosyncratic components that are normally distributed.
Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 hold for the remainder of the paper.
Assumption 2.1. The coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion is aE > 0 for
any entrepreneur and aI > 0 for any investor (who is not also an en-
trepreneur). In other words, the utility function for wealth x is exponential:
u(x) = −e−ax, a ∈ {aE , aI}.
Assumption 2.2. For all j, k = 1, . . . , NE, j = k, ε˜j = λ˜ + η˜j where
λ˜ ∼ N(0, σ2λ) and η˜j ∼ N(0, σ2η) such that Eλ˜η˜j = 0 and Eη˜j η˜k = 0.
Given Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2, there exists a strictly monotonic relation-
ship between expected utility and the certainty equivalent. Hence, maximiz-
ing expected utility of ﬁnal wealth is equivalent to maximizing the certainty
equivalent. From (1), the certainty equivalent of entrepreneur j is
CEj
(
{ωjk, pk}NEk=1
)
= μE
(
{ωjk, pk}NEk=1
)
− πE
(
{ωjk}NEk=1
)
, (3)
where the mean of ﬁnal wealth is
μE
(
{ωjk, pk}NEk=1
)
= ωjjθj + (1− ωjj)pj +
NE∑
k =j
(θk − pk)ωjk (4)
and the risk premium is
πE
(
{ωjk}NEk=1
)
=
aE
2
(
σ2η
NE∑
k=1
ω2jk + σ
2
λ
NE∑
k=1
NE∑
l=1
ωjkωjl
)
. (5)
6
Similarly, from (2), the certainty equivalent of investor i is
CEi
(
{zij , pj}NEj=1
)
= μI
(
{zij, pj}NEj=1
)
− πI
(
{zij}NEj=1
)
, (6)
where the mean of ﬁnal wealth is
μI
(
{zij , pj}NEj=1
)
= Wi +
NE∑
j=1
(θj − pj)zij (7)
and the risk premium is
πI
(
{zij}NEj=1
)
=
aI
2
(
σ2η
NE∑
j=1
z2ij + σ
2
λ
NE∑
j=1
NE∑
l=1
zijzil
)
. (8)
We now deﬁne the equilibrium. The ﬁnancial sector is assumed to be
perfectly competitive, i.e., prices are taken as given. Conditions 1 and 2
state the optimal policy functions for any entrepreneur and any investor,
respectively. Condition 3 states that prices equate demand and supply for
each asset.
Definition 2.3. The tuple
{{
ω∗jk
({p∗l }NEl=1)}NEk=1 ,{z∗ij ({p∗l }NEl=1)}NIi=1 , p∗j
}NE
j=1
is an equilibrium if
1. Given {p∗k}NEk=1, for j = 1, . . . , NE,
{
ω∗jk
({p∗l }NEl=1)}NEk=1 = arg max{ωjk}NE
k=1
CEj
(
{ωjk, p∗k}NEk=1
)
(9)
2. Given
{
p∗j
}NE
j=1
, for i = 1, . . . , NI,
{
z∗ij
({p∗l }NEl=1)}NEj=1 = arg max
{zij}NEj=1
CEi
({
zij , p
∗
j
}NE
j=1
)
(10)
3. Given
{{
ω∗jk
({pl}NEl=1)}NEk=1 ,{z∗ij ({pl}NEl=1)}NIi=1
}NE
j=1
, {p∗j}NEj=1 clear the ﬁ-
nancial markets.
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Proposition 2.4 characterizes the unique equilibrium. For a ﬁnite number
of agents, risk and risk aversion have an eﬀect on the equilibrium outcomes
(ﬁnancial prices and the allocation of risk among the agents). Since the
equilibrium values for risk sharing and the risk premium are the same across
agents, we simplify notation. Let ω∗ ≡ ω∗jk
({p∗l }NEl=1), π∗E ≡ π∗E ({p∗j}NEj=1
)
,
z∗ ≡ z∗ij
({p∗l }NEl=1), and π∗I ≡ π∗I ({p∗j}NEj=1
)
.
Proposition 2.4. For NI , NE < ∞, there exists a unique equilibrium. In
equilibrium,
1. For j = 1, . . . , NE, the price of risky asset j is
p∗j = θj −
aIaE(σ
2
η +NEσ
2
λ)
aINE + aENI
. (11)
2. For j = 1, . . . , NE, entrepreneur j holds a fraction
ω∗ =
aI
aINE + aENI
(12)
of ﬁrm k’s shares (k = 1, . . . , NE) so that his risk premium is
π∗E =
aE
2
(
σ2λ +
σ2η
NE
)(
aINE
aINE + aENI
)2
. (13)
3. For i = 1, . . . , NI , investor i purchases the fraction
z∗ =
aE
aINE + aENI
(14)
of ﬁrm k’s shares (k = 1, . . . , NE) so that his risk premium is
π∗I =
aI
2
(
σ2λ +
σ2η
NE
)(
aENE
aINE + aENI
)2
. (15)
Proof. See Appendix A.
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3 Analysis
Having characterized the unique equilibrium of an economy with risk sharing
for a ﬁnite number of entrepreneurs and investors, we next study whether
risk and risk aversion have an eﬀect on risk sharing in large economies with
numerous agents as well as in the limit economy. As noted in the introduc-
tion, Arrow-Lind type of theorems suggests that with a very large number of
investors, risk spreading eliminates any exposure to, and concern for risk. In
other words, while the agents are risk-averse, there is no need to account for
their risk aversion since they act as if they are risk-neutral. Hence, only the
expected payoﬀ of a risky asset has to be considered for trading decisions.
In our model, an increase in the number of investors increases the agents’
ability to spread risk among themselves, i.e., for a given number of risky
assets, an increase in the number of investors reduces each agent’s exposure
to a particular risk.3
Our purpose is not to prove a theorem about the convergence of the
economy but to show the eﬀect of a limiting argument that takes account
of only one aspect of the economy (the number of investors). We show that
a proper expansion of the economy with all sectors expanding implies that
a large number of investors does not eliminate exposure to risk and that
ﬁnancial prices reﬂect risk and risk aversion. This is true in the limit as well.
To see this, Proposition 3.1 states the limiting outcomes of the equilib-
rium deﬁned in Proposition 2.4. Because there are two groups of agents,
it is required to specify how diﬀerent groups grow relative to each other
as the economy expands, i.e., the limit of NE/NI must be speciﬁed. Con-
sider limNE ,NI→∞NE/NI = φ, 0 ≤ φ < ∞, which embeds two cases. The case
0 < φ < ∞ refers to a growing economy with a non-vanishing entrepreneurial
activity, i.e., entrepreneurial activity does not become insigniﬁcant as the
3An increase in NE has two eﬀects. First, a higher number of entrepreneurs also
increases the agents’ ability to spread risk among themselves since each entrepreneur
purchases shares of the risky assets issued by the other entrepreneurs. Second, a higher
number of risky assets increases the agents’ ability to diversify the risk in the economy.
In an integrated economy, agents beneﬁt not only from risk spreading but also from risk
diversiﬁcation, both of which have the eﬀect of reducing exposure to risk. See Salanie´
(1997, p. 53) for instance.
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economy grows. The case φ = 0 refers to a growing economy with a van-
ishing entrepreneurial activity, i.e., entrepreneurial activity becomes dwarfed
by the number of investors as the economy grows. From Proposition 3.1, the
limiting outcomes depend on the degree of entrepreneurial activity relative to
the overall economy. More entrepreneurial activity (a higher φ) decreases ﬁ-
nancial prices and increases (decreases) the amount of risk born by the group
of entrepreneurs (investors), which, in turn, increases (decreases) their risk
premium.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose that limNE ,NI→∞NE/NI = φ, 0 ≤ φ < ∞. Then,
from (11) to (15), in the limit,
1. For each asset j,
(a) The price is
lim
NE ,NI→∞
p∗j = θj −
aIaEφ
aIφ+ aE
σ2λ. (16)
(b) The share of risk borne by the group of entrepreneurs is
lim
NE ,NI→∞
NEω
∗ =
aIφ
aIφ+ aE
, (17)
and the share of risk borne by the group of investors is
lim
NE ,NI→∞
NIz
∗ =
aE
aIφ+ aE
. (18)
2. The risk premium of any entrepreneur is
lim
NE ,NI→∞
π∗E =
aEσ
2
λ
2
(
aIφ
aIφ+ aE
)2
, (19)
and the risk premium of any investor is
lim
NE ,NI→∞
π∗I =
aIσ
2
λ
2
(
aEφ
aIφ+ aE
)2
. (20)
We begin with the case of a growing economy with non-vanishing en-
trepreneurial activity, i.e., φ = 0. Proposition 3.2 states that neither a very
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large number of investors nor the limit remove the concern for risk. In other
words, all risk-averse agents are exposed to risk and do not act as if they were
risk-neutral.4 Hence, Arrow-Lind type of theorems suggesting that a large
number of investors spreading risk eliminates any exposure to, and concern
for risk does not hold for an economy expanding evenly, i.e., when no group
disappears and a fraction of the population has entrepreneurial prospects.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose that limNE ,NI→∞NE/NI = φ ∈ (0,∞). Then,
from (16) to (20),
1. Financial prices depend on risk and risk aversion.
2. The allocation of risk depends on risk aversion.
3. Each group bears risk, i.e., limNE ,NI→∞NEω
∗ ∈ (0, 1) and
limNE ,NI→∞NIz
∗ ∈ (0, 1)
4. Risk premiums are nonzero, i.e., limNI ,NE→∞ π
∗
E > 0 and
limNI ,NE→∞ π
∗
I > 0.
Using Proposition 3.2, we perform a comparative analysis of the eﬀect of
risk and risk aversion on equilibrium outcomes. Remark 3.3 provides a com-
parative analysis for ﬁnancial prices. Note that, except for the idiosyncratic
risk, the direction of the eﬀects of risk and risk aversion are identical for a
ﬁnite number of agents and in the limit. In the limit, the idiosyncratic risk
washes away through risk diversiﬁcation.
4Note that if everybody has entrepreneurial prospects (i.e., NE > 0, NI = 0), risk and
risk aversion still matters. From (16), the limiting price limNE→∞ p∗j |NI=0 = θj − aEσ2λ =
θj depends on risk and risk aversion.
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Remark 3.3. Suppose that limNE ,NI→∞NE/NI = φ ∈ (0,∞). Then, from (16),
in the limit,
1.
∂
(
limNE ,NI→∞ p
∗
j
)
∂aE
= − a
2
Iφ
2σ2λ
(aIφ+ aE)2
< 0.
2.
∂
(
limNE ,NI→∞ p
∗
j
)
∂aI
= − a
2
Eφσ
2
λ
(aIφ+ aE)
2 < 0.
3.
∂
(
limNE ,NI→∞ p
∗
j
)
∂σ2λ
= − aIaEφ
aIφ+ aE
< 0.
4.
∂
(
limNE ,NI→∞ p
∗
j
)
∂σ2η
= 0.
Remark 3.4 provides a comparative analysis for the allocation of risk
between the groups of entrepreneurs and investors. Note that the direction
of the eﬀects of risk and risk aversion are identical for a ﬁnite number of
agents and in the limit.
Remark 3.4. Suppose that limNE ,NI→∞NE/NI = φ ∈ (0,∞). Then, from (17)
and (18), in the limit,
1.
∂ (limNI ,NE→∞NEω
∗)
∂aE
< 0,
∂ (limNI ,NE→∞NIz
∗)
∂aE
> 0.
2.
∂ (limNI ,NE→∞NEω
∗)
∂aI
> 0,
∂ (limNI ,NE→∞NIz
∗)
∂aI
< 0.
Having shown that the expected payoﬀ is not suﬃcient to determine the
equilibrium amount of risk sharing in the presence of entrepreneurs, we now
turn to the restrictive case of an expansion of the economy with vanishing
entrepreneurial activity, i.e., φ = 0. Proposition 3.5 states that the limit-
ing outcomes of an economy with a vanishing entrepreneurial activity are
identical to an economy with a ﬁnite number of risk-averse entrepreneurs
and risk-neutral investors.5 Speciﬁcally, prices tend to the expected pay-
oﬀs (statement 1a). The entrepreneurs relinquish all shares to the investors
5To derive quickly the case of an economy with risk-averse entrepreneurs and risk-
neutral investors, evaluate (11) through (15) at aI = 0, which yields the limiting outcomes
stated in Proposition 3.5.
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(statement 1b) and thus face no risk (i.e., each entrepreneur’s risk premium
goes to zero in statement 2). Similarly, while in aggregate the investors take
on all the risk, individually they face no risk (i.e., investor’s risk premium
goes to zero in statement 3) as the risk is perfectly spread among themselves.
Proposition 3.5. Suppose that limNE ,NI→∞NE/NI = φ = 0. Then, from
(16) to (20), in the limit,
1. For each asset j,
(a) The price is limNE ,NI→∞ p
∗
j = θj.
(b) The group of investors bear all the risk, i.e., limNE ,NI→∞NEω
∗ = 0
and limNE ,NI→∞NIz
∗ = 1.
2. The risk premium of any agent is zero, i.e., limNE ,NI→∞ π
∗
E = 0. and
limNE ,NI→∞ π
∗
I = 0.
In the limit, risk-averse investors appear to behave as if they were risk-
neutral. However, risk-averse investors do not become risk-neutral in the
limit, rather the gamble disappears and so does the risk.6 Moreover, the
implication that a zero risk premium in the limit means that only expected
payoﬀ matters in pricing risky assets leads to an inconsistency.
Suppose that the ﬁnancial markets set prices equal to the expected payoﬀ
without any consideration for risk and risk aversion, i.e., p∗j = θj . Consider
ﬁrst an economy with risk-averse entrepreneurs and risk-neutral investors.
In this case, the risk-averse entrepreneurs are always able to pass all the risk
onto risk-neutral investors. Consider next a large economy with risk-averse
entrepreneurs and risk-averse investors. Regardless of the number of risk-
averse investors, each price-taking investor receives a zero expected return
θj − p∗j = 0. Hence, with zero expected return, no risk-averse investor has
an incentive to buy shares of a risky asset. Formally, from (6), (7), and (8)
6Consider N agents who share a risk. Dividing a given risk more and more ﬁnely
among a growing number of agents causes the risk premium to vanish not because the
agents become risk-neutral but because the gamble faced by each agent disappears.
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evaluated at the equilibrium prices, the certainty equivalent increases when
zij > 0 decreases. That is, for zij > 0,
∂CEi
({
zij , p
∗
j
}NE
j=1
)
∂zij
∣∣∣∣∣∣
p∗j=θj
< 0. (21)
While there is no gain from engaging in risk sharing on the part of the
investors, each entrepreneur has no incentive to hold any of the risky asset,
since the price is equal to the expected payoﬀ, and would like to push the
entire investment oﬀ onto the investors. This is not viable, and, thus, no
trading is possible. Hence, to reiterate,
Remark 3.6. Suppose that the ﬁnancial price is equal to the expected payoﬀ
of the risky asset. Then,
1. Risk-neutral investors take on all the risk, while
2. Risk-averse investors refuse to trade.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.4. From (6) and (10), the ﬁrst-order conditions of
investor i are (in matrix form)
(
σ2λJNE + σ
2
ηINE
)
zi =
1
aI
X, (22)
where JNE is anNE×NE-dimensional matrix of 1’s, INE is anNE-dimensional
identity matrix, zi = [zi1, . . . , ziNE ]
T , andX = [θ1−p1, . . . , θNE−pNE ]T . Pre-
multiplying (22) by
(
σ2λJNE + σ
2
ηINE
)−1
yields investor i’s demand for asset
j:
z∗ij
({pl}NEl=1) = σ2η + (NE − 1) σ2λaIσ2η (σ2η +NEσ2λ) (θj − pj)−
σ2λ
aIσ2η
(
σ2η +NEσ
2
λ
) NE∑
l =j
(θl − pl),
(23)
j = 1, . . . , NE .
From (3) and (9), the ﬁrst-order conditions of entrepreneur j are (in
matrix form) (
σ2λJNE + σ
2
ηINE
)
ωj =
1
aE
X, (24)
where ωj = [ωj1, . . . , ωjNE ]
T . Premultiplying (24) by
(
σ2λJNE + σ
2
ηINE
)−1
yields entrepreneur j’s demand for asset k:
ω∗jk
({pl}NEl=1) = σ2η + (NE − 1)σ2λaEσ2η (σ2η +NEσ2λ) (θk − pk)−
σ2λ
aEσ2η
(
σ2η +NEσ
2
λ
) NE∑
l =k
(θl − pl) ,
(25)
k = 1, . . . , NE .
The ﬁnancial price for asset j satisﬁes the market clearing condition
1− ω∗jj
({p∗l }NEl=1) =
NI∑
i=1
z∗ij
({p∗l }NEl=1)+
NE∑
k =j
ω∗kj
({p∗l }NEl=1) , (26)
j = 1, . . . , NE . Plugging (23) and (25) into (26) and solving for equilibrium
prices yields (11). Plugging (11) into (23) and (25) yields (12) and (14),
15
respectively. Plugging (12) and (14) into (5) and (8) yields (13) and (15),
respectively.
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